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 NOTES AND MEMORANDA
 THE INDIAN CURRENCY
 IT is now proposed to make a fresh shift of the scenes in the Indian
 currency experiment. Already it has been demonstrated that a mone-
 tary standard can be appreciated by cutting off the supply, and that
 this appreciation can proceed when the value of the metal used- as
 standard is falling, provided always that some confidence exists as to
 the continuity of the policy of contraction. Both these results theoretic-
 ally follow from the conditions of the experiment, but that they would
 follow, in fact, has been stoutly denied by those who should know
 better.
 Three main causes have operated to bring about the fresh departure
 now desired by the Indian Government. The rupee has for soine time
 past been hovering about the region of Is. 4d. There is a feeling
 amongst the public that it is time to reassure and attract English
 capital by announcing an early termination to the present lengthy period
 of transition. Finally, Indian banks and business houses, growing restive,
 are realising at last that contraction takes place through the unwelcome
 channel of a tight money market. Had this been realised five years
 ago it is extremely doubtful whether the present policy could ever have
 been initiated.
 Sir James Westland proposes to put an end to the present uncer-
 tainty by taking power to borrow ten millions sterling, which he proposes
 to use to withdraw and melt as many crores as may be found necessary
 to attain and retain a par of Is. 4d. Incidentally, as the details of
 these proposals are unfolded, the opinion is hazarded that not more
 than five millions sterling will probably be required to secure success,
 the assumption being that this sum, or, to speak more accurately.
 ?5,300,000, would enable us to withdraw twenty crores from a eircula-
 tion of about 130 crores, an, d that this withdrawal would appreciate the
 rupee to the par desired. Mr. Lindsay seeks to attain the same result
 by a different process. He would have the Government start as a,
 stock-jobber and offer to buy or sell rupees in the region of Is. 4d. at a,
 difference in favour of the jobber of about two per cent. To induce
 confidence in the jobber's solvency, he would borrow and keep in the
 No. 30.-VOL. VJII. Q
This content downloaded from 128.163.2.206 on Mon, 27 Jun 2016 09:20:40 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 222 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL
 Government shop-window about ten millions sterling. Like Sir James
 Westland he also contemplates the possible necessity of melting rupees
 to meet a drop in the exchanges.
 With characteristic business acuteness the blot in this carefully worked
 out scheme is hit in Sir James's minute printed in the recent Blue Book.
 The ruling rate of exchange at the present time is not Is. 4d. During
 times of active export the rate may reach this level, but it is much
 lower at other times in the year. Mr. Lindsay is therefore offering an
 unnecessarily favourable rate to the seller of rupees. Indeed, until the
 exchanges have been brought up to a fairly stable equilibrium, there is a
 considerable risk of the Government being "hammered" on its first
 appearance as a broker.
 Before entering on a general criticism of the merits of the Lindsay,
 Probyn, and Government schemes, some remarks on the wisdom of
 melting up rupees may not be out of place, The only cure for a redun-
 dant currency is undoubtedly contraction, but before announcing a
 definite policy, whether that advocated by Mr. Lindsay or the Govern-
 ment, it might be advisable to attempt to ascertain the probable limit
 of the annual fluctuation in the rupee. If this could be done Govern-
 ment would avoid the risk, inconvenience, and discredit of attempting a
 task which experience may show to be beyonid the powers now asked for.
 At present we are much in the dark as to the force required to prevent
 the exchanges running down when the export trade slackens. The
 difference in the exchanges in, say, August and the spring is probably,
 ceterispari bus, not less than Id. or 1Id. We, however, have not the least
 idea what number of rupees or sovereigns thrown on the other side of
 the scale would prevent this fall. Yet this is a principal part of the
 problem, and caution should prompt us to try and arrive at the solution
 before hazarding a guess and pledging our financial reputation on its cor-
 rectness. And it should not be difficult for us to collect valuable evidence
 upon this point and at the same time steady the exchanges. At present
 we hold ten crores of rupees in our currency note reserve. I would
 cancel the greater part of this holding and create an equivalent
 quantity of gold debt. This would be held as security for the note
 issue; only it would be held by the Secretary of State in London
 instead of by the Government of India in Calcutta. I would utilise
 the change in the following manner. Experience shows that the
 Secretary of State can sell drafts to advantage in the busy seasons of
 the year, but with difficulty in the slack seasons. In other words, when
 the banks require funds to finance the export trade, and when the balance
 of trade is in our favour, he can sell high, but when trade is dull he has
 to reduce his drawings and lower his rates. Now we want to find out
 what the mean rate for the year really is, and if possible to steady the
 rate. We can make somie progress towards this end by utilising this gold
 debt.
 My meaning is best illustrated by an example. Let us suppose
 that in April the Secretary of State can sell 80 lakhs or so at Is. 37d.,
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 and that to meet his liabilities he requires to sell 40 lakhso a week
 during July, August and September. He finds, however, that trade
 will only take about 20 lakhs except at rates appreciably lower. I
 would then only offer 20 lakhs and make. up the difference by selling
 our gold paper. The amount required would be an extra 20 lakhs for 12
 weeks according to my hypothetical example, i.e., 240lakhs. This amount
 the Secretary of State would realise and pay over from his currency
 note reserve to his treasury balance. Simultaneously the treasury in
 India would pay over the 240 lakhs to the currency note reserve in
 India, It would not of course be necessary to sell the whole 240 lakhs
 at once. The market could be studied and favourable opportunities
 seized. If it was found that as a fact this transfer of 240 lakhs kept
 exchange steady, we should know that the solution of our problem was
 probably well within our power. If the contrary were the case, then the
 following year a greater quantity of the gold paper could be utilised in
 this way. In the event of the whole being engulfed we should see
 that the present proposals of the Indian Government would stand a
 small chance of success. Personally I should prefer if my expedient
 proved successful to leave the raising of the exchange to the operation
 of time. Once the rupee was steady, with a tendency to rise, it could
 be left to rise in the manner sketched by me until our par was reached.
 The a-dvantages of these suggestions are as follows. We should
 promise nothing. The scheme would be economical, for we should not
 borrow anything fresh. Whether we succeeded or not we should to
 some extent have steadied exchange. We could at any time retrace our
 steps by buying back our gold paper with our rupees held in India. It
 would not be necessary to remit to India the interest on that part of
 the gold debt we still held. The Secretary of State could credit this
 interest to his treasury balances in England, and the Indian treasury
 could simultaneously credit the currency note reserve in India with
 the equivalent. Public criticism would be averted; the public would not
 know what was going on and would have no handle for comment.
 The scheme would not appear strange to the exchange banks or Indian
 houses of business, for the scheme is a mere extension of our present
 manipulation of our currency and treasury balances. At the present
 moment funds are transferred from our branch treasuries to head-
 quarters, and from one headquarters to another by this very method. If
 I want, as Government treasurer, to transfer funds from Delhi to
 Lahore or from Lahore to Calcutta, I credit in the first instance
 funds at Delhi to the currency department and simultaneously transfer
 funds from the Lahore currency balances to the Lahore treasury
 balances; similarly in the second instance I credit funds to Lahore
 currency from Lahore treasury and simultaneously debit Calcutta
 currency and credit Calcutta treasury.
 The great objection to these suggestions, and I fully admit its
 weight, is a purely political one. The public are getting discontented,
 and it may be wisest to end this feeling of unrest by an expensive coutp
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 de main, somewhat on the lines of that advocated by the Indian
 Government. Moreover, the earlier the success the sooner will much
 needed capital come into and return to the country.
 I now pass to the schemes propounded by Mr. Lindsay and the
 Indian Government. I have already adverted to the well-founded
 objection taken by Sir James Westland to the introduction of the
 Lindsay scheme so long as the rupee has not reached or nearly reached
 our par, but other objections are also taken to it, not all of which are
 forcible. It is, I think, most desirable that Government should appear
 to meddle as little as possible with the exchanges. Mr. Lindsay's
 English and gold standard offices will be the target of much ignorant
 criticism, and will invite pressure on the one side and the other to
 lower or raise the rates fixed, whereas under the Government scheme
 the sovereign will come and go as the exchanges alter, without inviting
 criticism or comment. On the other hand, I see no serious objection
 to the gold being held in London, and much to be said in its favour.
 Considerable stress is also laid upon the undesirability of Government
 controlling the volume of the silver currency. But Mr. Lindsay's scheme
 gives both a maximum and minimum rate, and it is by no means certain
 that the ebb and flow of the currency of a poor country like India can be
 conveniently left to the movements of the sovereign. On the other hand,
 the Government scheme does not provide for any method of increasing
 the volume of the silver currency automatically, and does not therefore,
 in my view, meet the situation adequately. Moreover, it is extremely
 doubtful whether Government could sell ten crores of rupees as bullion
 at the present prices during anytwelve months. Werethe scheme adopted
 I should, on the whole, prefer to see the quality of legal tender withdrawn
 from silver for sums greater than 10,000 rupees. There would then not
 be the same objection to its coinage under restrictions similar to those
 governing the mintage of small coin. Whatever scheme be adopted
 there does not appear to be any objection to the Government holding
 much of its gold in bars as Mr. Probyn advocates, and this course
 would be economical and more in accordance with modern theory. It
 is practically certain that most of the gold would be held as the backing
 of notes.
 Before bringing these somewhat disjointed remarks to a close,
 I would like to point out that there is some danger at the
 present time of an unduly favourable view being taken regarding the
 immediate future of exchange. The famine has probably brought out
 a certain quantity of rupees from hoards which have been easily ab-
 sorbed in the circulation, owing to the high price of food grains. To
 this may be attributed in a small degree the present high rates of the
 rupee. Again, this year the reduction in the Secretary of State's
 drawings, due to financial difficulties, has also contributed to apprecia-
 tion. In ordinary tinmes both these causes will be absent; and on the
 other hand there is some fear of a return to an ambitious programme
 of railway extension, leading to a very undesirable increase in the gold
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 liabilities. The prospect of exchange is therefore not by any means
 so certainly favourable as the Indian Government appear to think.
 F. C. H.
 THE RUSSIAN CURRENCY REFORM.1
 BEFORE setting forth the course of the reform of the Russian
 currency, carried out during recent years, it may be well to give
 a short historical account of the paper circulation in Russia.
 The beginning of the paper currency in Russia is assigned to the
 reign of Catherine II. The financial difficulties caused by the Turkish
 War of 1768 induced the government to issue in 1769 " assignats"
 for one million roubles. Before the end of 1769 the quantity issued
 reached 2,619,975 r. Since that time the number of assignats
 rapidly augmented, so that the Government was soon obliged to restrict
 their convertibility. Simultaneously the assignats began to depre-
 ciate. Towards the end of the reign of Catherine II. (1796) their
 number had grown to 157'7 millions r., which were depreciated to the
 level of 79 copecks in silver for 1 r. in assignats.
 During the reign of the Emperor Paul (1796-1801) the number of
 assignats reached 221'5 millions r., and their value underwent a
 further depreciation. The Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the
 nineteenth century led to a great increase of the issue of assignats,
 so that in 1815 their number had already attained 825-8 millions r.,
 whilst the value of one paper rouble had fallen by that year to 20 cop.
 in silver.
 The period of peace, which followed the year 1815, rendered it
 possible to regulate the paper currency, and towards the year 1823 the
 paper circulation was reduced to 595'8 millions r. However, during
 the following fifteen years the Government undertook no decisive
 measure, and confined its attention to keeping up the quantity of
 paper money at the same level. In consequence the course of the
 assignats began to acquire a considerable stability: thus during the
 period from 1832 to 1838 it fluctuated only between 27'1 and 27'4 cop.
 It is also to be remarked, that during this time coin was circulating in
 the country as well as assignats. At last a law was enacted on
 July 1, 1839, which fixed the value of assignats at 28'6 cop., i.e. one
 silver rouble was declared to be worth 3 r. 50 cop. in paper notes. in
 1841 the Government began to issue a new kind of paper notes con-
 vertible into coin at their nominal value, called "' credit notes." A
 law of 1843 proclaimed that all the issued assignats should be
 replaced by credit notes (at the same course of 3 r. 50 c. for one r. in
 credit notes).- Simultaneously credit notes were declared to be legal
 tender as well as silver coin. For the sake of sustaining their conver-
 tibility a metallic reserve was established, the amount of which was
 1 All dates in this article are old style.
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